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Native and Colonial Americans had vastly different approaches to the world, and
viewed nature and other people in quite dissimilar ways. The concept of self is central to
this project because personal values and attitudes toward others are grounded in agency –
actions that emerge from the self and define the way that one treats his or her
surroundings and everyone or thing in it. The way that one’s self is perceived is
necessarily communicated within the context of social settings. Situation in a world of
other people (and of nature) requires that actions be weighed in accordance with agency.
The very concept of what it is to have self is a key way to understand a world-view,
because the values that are central to cultural communities have their locus within self.
As such, the importance of defining to what or to whom one is agent must be addressed.
The concepts of self that were fostered in members of tribes and early settlement
communities contributed greatly to the world-views of their members, and consequently
the treatment of their surroundings. One aim of Native American religions was to
cultivate within tribal members the worthiness of respect harbored within beings of all
sorts. Native American oral traditions established in members, from early on, the skill of
actively listening to nature and the mindset that the earth and its inhabitants should be
approached with care and respect. This was apparent in the treatment of nature, for
personhood was extended to living creatures of all kinds, and even what we might regard
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as inanimate objects. Native Americans viewed themselves as vitally related to all other
living powers of the world. These approaches to interacting with nature, combined with a
word-view that was willing to accept a wide array of entities as beings, instilled a broad
concept of self within Native American peoples.
In contrast, based on traditional Western thought - foundationally that of
Descartes and highly influenced by John Locke - Colonial Americans developed a very
different concept of self from which members of this culture saw the world as
hierarchical. As a result, selves turned inward and understood personal existence as other
than, or separate from, nature. Persons were manifestly cognitive beings with moral
agency, and only other beings with the same attributes should be afforded equal respect
or regarded as having rights, as such. The thematic that developed as a result was, and
still is today, founded upon the value of property ownership and the utilization of
property and natural resources for production.
Why is it important to look at the individual Native American tribe member or
Colonial American community member? Since the actions of each member contribute to
the wellbeing of the whole group, and consequently of nature, it is important to grasp
how self-conduct that is necessarily a product of the individual self, fits into the bigger
picture and affects the attitudes and actions of the individual toward other people and the
environment. This coincides with the purpose of this project to show how the concept of
self for Native Americans can be illuminating in many ways, consequently casting light
on how we might learn from their ways, rather than give the impression to readers that
one concept of self is any better or worse than the other. It is my aim to illustrate the
unique and intriguing way that Native Americans view the self as part of nature, and
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investigate how these differing concepts of self, in relation to nature, affect how the these
groups act toward nature. My hope is that readers will be encouraged to reflect on their
own values and the roles that those values play in modern America, including some of the
implications that these concepts of self have had in the past and continue to have for the
future.
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PREFACE
In 2002, November was declared Native American Heritage month. Throughout
the month, celebrations of Native American cultures are held, and Native American
contributions to the history of America as a nation are recognized. It must be difficult to
live in the midst of a society that, overall, holds very different values than those taught by
members of one’s own heritage. Most people, of both European and Native heritages,
understand the reasons that Native American cultures have been largely suppressed
within the course of America’s development, but do we really understand who the Native
American, or even European American, truly is as a self? Why do Americans today hold
property ownership in such high regard? Where has this value gotten us today, and might
it have turned out much differently if Colonial Americans had learned from rather than
rejected Native American values and traditions? In the midst of discussions about
pollution, climate change, and sustainability, why has there been a trend to find answers
about how to better our environment through studying Native American practices and
values?
These questions, and many others, can be answered by taking an in-depth look at
what constituted the self for both Native and Colonial Americans. In order to do so, it is
important to understand the beliefs that fund the self as a product of a given culture.
Thus, exploring the systems of beliefs and ideas that are couched in these differing
cultures should help us better understand how they contributed to the ways that their
members viewed the world. In Chapters One and Two, I will lay out the foundations for
the Colonial and Native American selves, respectively. The purpose of developing the
fullest possible concepts of self is to pave the way for a more in-depth discussion of the
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differences between these views in Chapter Three. I am especially interested in why those
differences resulted in difficulty for European Americans to understand the Native
American world-view, as well as the disparity in the ways the two groups have
subsequently approached and treated nature. Perhaps one reason that we face ecological
crises stems from inherited assumptions, and these assumptions still frame the nature of
the debate. By looking at Native American culture, perhaps some of those assumptions
can be revealed, and alternatives to how Americans treat nature today might be explored.
There is an array of written work that may be referenced in regard to the Colonial
American world–view, but as one might expect of any true oral tradition, there is no
forthright account of Native American philosophy that was neatly laid out in a book by
tribal elders. Furthermore, Native American cultures are many, and no two are exactly
alike in every way. Most Native American books include historical facts, interviews with
chiefs or medicine men, and myths and a wealth of stories that were passed on from
generation to generation. The most direct way to approach a general Native American
theory of self is by studying the lore and legends of the tribes, as well as ceremonies,
rituals, and accounts of members in order to find a common thread throughout the various
cultures. In doing so, one essentially develops what can be termed an “ethnophilosophy.” Thus, by studying worldviews of several Native American cultures and
determining what general similar features that their world-views consist of, one can
further develop what a concept of self would be like for tribe members.
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CHAPTER 1
THE COLONIAL AMERICAN SELF
“The I of the primary word I-It makes its appearance as individuality and becomes
conscious of itself as subject (of experiencing and using).”
--Martin Buber, I and Thou

This chapter will examine the concept of the self that was dominant in Colonial
America. Colonial Americans were influenced and shaped both by religious beliefs and
the writings of prominent thinkers of the day. Among the reasons for taking on the danger
and adventure of settling the new land was interest in the pursuit of freely practicing a
chosen religion without the threat of persecution. But there was also influence generated
from the ideals of the Enlightenment – the advancement of natural science and interest in
political liberty – that were very different from the religious motivations that had been
brewing in Europe. Both of these influences were primary features that contributed to the
shaping of Colonial America. The Colonist self probably did not realize that many of his
values would become tacitly engraved upon much of the American psyche today.
In order to elicit a better understanding of the Colonial American self as a private
being, separate from nature, I will first briefly discuss some ways that religion was a
factor in the shaping of the self, paying specific attention to the influence of Protestant,
and especially Puritanical precepts. In the light of these religious influences, I will then
center my focus upon the writings of John Locke, who was perhaps one of the most
influential thinkers in promoting enlightened moral and political views of his time, and is
especially well known in regard to his thoughts on natural law. In doing so, I hope to
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construct a palpable concept of the Colonial American self as a private, intelligent being
with rights and agency, concerned with freedom, in ownership of himself and his labor
which may be mingled with nature for his own purposes. I will then use the idea of the
Colonial American self to compare and contrast with the Native American self.

Part 1: Religious Influence
Many of the Colonial American settlers were fleeing from religious persecution
from the Anglican Church; enmity between Protestants and Catholics, and also amongst
Protestant sects ran quite heavily in both directions. Although the settlements themselves
were often seen as commercial ventures, many colonists were also motivated by their
desire to promote their religious beliefs and see the Church prosper, and the new land was
viewed as a safe haven – a place to practice and reform the doctrines that Catholicism had
diluted. Protestants and Puritans alike, the latter being derived from the former,1 had a
strong presence in Colonial America.
According to Perry Miller, “The character of Puritanism was determined as much
by the questions which Luther and Calvin did not solve as by those which they did. Out
of both church and theology they swept whatever seemed to them corruptions insinuated
by the Papacy.”2 The disenchantment that these followers felt toward Catholicism, at
least the way it was being represented by the Papacy, was a driving force behind the
reformation. The strong spirit of Protestants and Catholics alike fueled their willingness
1

Perry Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York, New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1939), 92. Henceforth referred to as NEM:SC. Miller states, “Obviously, the major part of
Puritan thought was taken bodily from sixteenth-century Protestantism. From the great reformers came the
whole system of theology, definitions of terms, orientation of interests, interpretations of Scripture, and
evaluations of previous scholarship. In fact, Puritan thinking was fundamentally so much a repetition of
Luther and Calvin, and Puritans were so far from contributing any new ideas, that there is reason to doubt
whether a distinctly Puritan thought exists.”
2
Ibid., 94.

2

to venture to the new world. According to Porter, “Max Weber argued in his Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5) that the Reformation spurred a new
individuality, thanks to the reformers’ doctrine of the priesthood of all believers:
salvation must be a personal pilgrimage, a matter of faith alone (solifidianism); it could
not be parceled out by priests in pardons and other papist bribes.”3 And so the Protestants
had good reason to emerge from beneath the constraints and practices of the Catholic
Church. They soon made the voyage to find a new place in the world where they could
purify themselves and simplify their religious practices, freeing themselves of both
Anglican persecution and the vestments and ceremonies of Catholicism that contributed
to the formalism that Protestants had come to detest.4
It is important to emphasize that the Puritan-Protestant movement in the Colonies,
and also the incoming of other left-wing religious groups, was tremendously influential in
the realm of politics.5 In fact, their influence on political thought was greater than that of
the Lutherans: Calvinism was considered, “not only a creed but a system of government.
Calvinism implied a partnership between religion and government, the State serving as
the protecting arm of the Church,” whereas Lutherans believed that the Church was
obligated “to establish the kingdom of God on earth,” with State considered a “separate
sphere.”6 The number of Protestant settlers was much greater in comparison with
Catholics, most of who were established in Maryland, which would prove to be the only

3

Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 6.
Henceforth referred to as FAR.
4
William Warren Sweet, Religion in Colonial America (New York, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1942), 19. Henceforth referred to as RCA.
5
Specifically, the Anabaptists and Mennonites of Europe, and Calvinists were fleeing, whereas the German
Lutherans were more driven by economic advantage than freedom from religious persecution (RCA, 15).
6
Ibid., 14.
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English Catholic refuge colony from the secular momentum that began carrying the
English Reformation, with State beginning to emerge as the leader over the Church.7
Thus, the Puritans became dynamic in their influence in the new land. Their
numbers grew into the tens of thousands within ten years from the 1630 sailing of
seventeen Massachusetts Bay Company ships, chartered by King Charles I, carrying the
first thousand Puritan passengers - including the wealthy and influential Puritan leader
John Winthrop.8 The religious ideas and beliefs that they carried with them, and their
dedication to upholding the Puritan way of life permeated their communities. They
weren’t particularly driven to convert or save heathens, but even their influence in what
are considered secular aspects of societal living, such as economic interests, inner and/or
outer community and political relationships, and academic endeavors, was undeniable.
The Puritan’s use of established knowledge to benefit them in their journey to
salvation was rigorous. It seems odd at first blush that people so religiously inclined
would wish to glean anything from works that could be considered secular; but according
to Miller they did just that. He points out that, “Had Puritans merely recited in order the
points of dogma and not also endeavored to grasp assertions of the creed, there would be
no accounting for the intellectual history of the last three centuries…they did not
therefore cast aside the traditions of their age, nor did they renounce all learning save
theology or lose interest in other inquires besides religious.”9 In order to understand the
Bible as well as possible, even though they could never actually grasp it, or God, in all of
its true holiness, they sought to improve their minds. Puritans did not just accept
everything; rather, they picked over and chose ideas from various works that would
7

As James I took the throne, Catholicism had already been outlawed in England (RCA, 16-18).
Ibid., 21, 22.
9
NEM:SC, 65.
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support their convictions. Hence, although belief was first priority, rigorous studies of
intellectual materials that aided in understanding the Bible and explaining the rationale
behind their beliefs were also very important.10
Among philosophical works, John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Understanding became known well by the Puritans. Among the “New England
divines,”11 were Puritan writers who wished to reconcile the problem of how there
seemed to be a rational order to the universe when it is governed by a “super-rational
absolutism.”12 They also received criticism on their views of the soul and regeneration
that forced them to deal with problems in Cartesian philosophy.13 The introduction of
John Locke’s work was a welcome solution to the problem of how the soul can be
separated from the flesh when released from its worldly abode. Locke’s theory picked up
Descartes’ dualism of mind and body but rejected his theory of innate ideas. Combined
with Locke’s non-commitment to attachment of soul (or mind) and substance, his is much
more coalescent with the Puritan’s idea of divine, regenerated soul dwelling in an
inherently sinful body; the soul was destined for eternal life, the latter destined to return
to ash according to the scriptures. The separation of body and soul played an integral role
in the Puritans’ understanding of self. Although necessarily embodied in earthly life, the
soul is not of the world. The actions undertaken in the world are the soul’s responsibility,

10

Miller writes, “Divine wisdom overflows the limits of human reason, and the mind of man is terribly
decayed; hence the universe does not always seem to conform to the principles of human rationality. Faith
must keep reason at heel. But no matter how irrational the government of God may seem to His
uncomprehending creatures, it is so only in appearance. Faith is called upon to believe, not merely in
redemption, but in the reason behind all things. The regenerated intellect may not understand “abstract
wisdome,” but it can catch at least a glimmering. By the very fact of being regenerated the intellect is dutybound to strive for such a glimpse” (NEM:SC, 69).
11
Ibid, 239.
12
Ibid.
13
Although Miller does not say so explicitly, one can infer that the problem was with the Cartesian idea of
a “pineal gland,” where the soul and body somehow come together.
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but ultimately it will dwell elsewhere eternally. It was thus the case that temporary
earthly matters, including the use of nature as a means for life on earth, were of less
consequence than the health of the soul.
In order to preserve the health of the soul it was necessary to find guidance
through scripture. Proper interpretation and understanding of the Bible required reasoning
abilities, and thus learning was of great importance for honing the mind. Philosophic
works certainly exercised the reasoning skills of readers, and the Puritans were interested
in using reason to their spiritual advantage. Thus, Puritans did not reject philosophy;
rather, they used it as a tool to explain and validate their own doctrines. Without reason,
their ability to live according to God’s commands would be in vain for lack of ability to
interpret His word on even the paltry level that man is capable of. Locke’s writings
offered some degree of respite from the criticisms that were raised against Puritan
theories based on Cartesian thought. Locke’s work, which was instrumental in justifying
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, became influential in the new land also due to its
political message, including attractive views on moral agency and property ownership.

Part 2: Lockean Influence
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises Of
Government were published in 1690, just after the “Glorious Revolution” in which
parliament ousted the king. His Two Treatises Of Government were widely popular as
defenses of this action, and the Essay Concerning Human Understanding was seen as the
basis for what became the “Enlightenment.” Locke was seen as a revolutionary thinker by
anyone’s standards, opening up a new way of thinking about selves and society. Peter
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Laslett recognizes Locke’s importance in the era, stating about John Locke’s Two
Treatises of Government, “The prime reason for the importance attached to this book of
Locke’s is its enormous historical influence.”14 The influence of liberalist thought was
especially prominent in Colonial America - this new land truly served as the embodiment
of these values. Daniel Walker Howe writes in his work, The Making of the American
Self, “The liberal outlook is much newer [than the republican], originating in the
Enlightenment, where it is particularly identified with the writings of John Locke and
Adam Smith.”15 It is no wonder that Locke’s epistemological and political thought can be
traced through the writings of prominent authors such as Thomas Paine, Jonathan
Edwards, and Benjamin Franklin, to name only a few.
Locke’s epistemology is critical for understanding exactly what qualities and
capabilities must be present in order to consider any given entity a self; namely,
capabilities for consciousness and reasonable thinking. The picture of a Colonial
American self as a being that had rights, and full ownership of himself and his labor, will
then be more fully developed with the addition of Locke’s views on natural law, and can
be discussed more completely in the light of his political thought by placing the self, a
private core of referential activity, in the midst of other selves (and non-selves),
necessarily; looking at the self apart from all others would be a misrepresentation of the
world in reality.
In the new land, concern about establishing positive law (i.e., governmental
agency, rights, and autonomy) was a main priority. Because positive law is couched in

14

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), II.ii.4: 3. Henceforth referred to as TTG.
15
Daniel W. Howe, Making the American Self (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.
Henceforth referred to as MAS.
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natural law, the latter was also, understandably, of great interest. There was strong
awareness that the characters and moral mindsets of colonial settlers held crucial
implications for both the type and the amount of governance required in order to allow
for the greatest measure of freedom possible, yet maintain the necessary boundaries
required for peaceful societal living. Certainly, many great thinkers influenced early
Colonial America, and among the consummate was British philosopher John Locke.
Although the ordinary Colonial man may not have read Locke, his ideas were present and
discussed widely. Wherein it is true that the Colonial self in general was a product of
English protestant culture, and especially the Puritans, it is also true that Locke’s ideas
were influential enough so as to be grafted upon this trunk. Furthermore, Locke offered
ideas in the more intellectualized terms that educated people were inclined to embrace.
In fact, Locke’s own writings, especially his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, are momentous. Although his Essay was written and is typically read as a
completely separate work from his Two Treatises, it may also be seen as an integral part
of the overall view and construction of his politics.16 Laslett writes:
The famous doctrine of the tabula rasa, for example, the blank sheet of the mind
on which experience and experience alone can write, made men begin to feel that
the whole world is new for everyone and we are all absolutely free of what has
gone before. The political results of such an attitude have been enormous. It was,
perhaps, the most effective solvent of the natural-law attitude. In a sense these

16

Laslett writes, “Some such construction [between the Essay and Two Treatises] as this might be made by
a modern scholar attempting to create a theory of politics out of Locke’s Essay, if, as so nearly happened, it
had never become certainly known that Two Treatises was also Locke’s. Such an exercise might have
illuminating results, though it cannot be our subject here, for the implications of Locke’s theory of
knowledge for politics and political thinking were very considerable and acted quite independently of the
influence of Two Treatises,” (TTG, 84).
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results were intended. For though Locke wrote the Essay about how men know
things, his final object, the object he had in mind when he started, was to help
men know what to do.17
Thus, it is not merely possible but essential to link the epistemic self to the political self,
for the beliefs, values, desires, and activities of the former are those of the latter as well.
The epistemic self and the concept of natural law are coalescent in Locke’s political
theory. As such, both Locke’s Essay and his Two Treatises will serve as fundamental
references for this discourse on the Colonial American self-concept.

Part 3: Epistemic Self
The most important premise upon which the Colonial concept of self was based is
offered by Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding: “[Self is] that
conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material,
simple or compounded, it matters not) – which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and
pain, and capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that
consciousness extends.”18 Clearly, consciousness is at the forefront of Locke’s
proposition as the basis of the self. But consciousness alone is not enough according to
his statement; rather, it is a conscious thinking thing that constitutes the self, regardless of
the substance in which consciousness inheres. Locke states, “[This being premised], to
find wherein personal identity consists we must consider what person stands for; which, I
think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that
17

Ibid.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser (New York, New York:
Barnes and Noble, 2004), II.xxvii.19: 270. Henceforth referred to as ECHU.
18
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consciousness that is inseparable from thinking [and] essential to it.”19 Thus, at the root
of the Colonial concept of self, we must determine what it meant to be not only a
conscious and thinking thing existing in a spatial-temporal world, but also an intelligent
being with the capacity for reason and reflection. Furthermore, the role of substance in
regard to the self must be clarified based on the bold assertion that “it [substance] matters
not,” as Locke has put forth.
What is it to be conscious? By definition, it is an irrefutable assertion that
consciousness is a state of awareness, or alertness. In Lockean terms, consciousness also
espouses the condition for the possibility to have a personal identity. In other words, it is
necessary to perceive that one perceives.20 This continual perception, shot through with
the constant (although perhaps subconscious) awareness of unfolding time, allows one
the knowledge that I am the one perceiving, experiencing and undergoing sensations
from this moment to the next, as an ongoing process, and so consciousness is thus
inextricably bound with thinking. The union of consciousness and thinking permits
identity, or as Locke states, “The sameness of a rational being,” whereupon one realizes
that he or she is an individual, set apart from other beings, and experiencing sensations
uniquely his or her own.21 Identity thus consists of present awareness that I am the one
experiencing and perceiving in the here and now, but it also requires reflection upon the
knowledge that I have also experienced sensations in the past. Hence, reflection on past
experiences and continual consciousness that I perceived them, as the same self that I am
now, delimits my self as an individual to my own experiences.

19

Ibid., II.xxvii.11: 265.
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
20
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Locke took into consideration, with the theory of individual self put forth as above,
the argument that consciousness is often interrupted by forgetfulness, sleep, and strict
attention to the thoughts of the present.22 Taking these possibilities into account, and also
the potential for changes undergone by the physical substance in which the self resides,
he stood on the notion that the self is preserved by the “unity of one continued life.”23
This implies that the self and the “man” are not necessarily the same thing. If one should
lose all recollection of specific events one experienced in the past, the man will remain
the same in identity, but the self would not be the same.24 Here, it seems that Locke
asserts that the self is immaterial; however, he did not go so far as to deny that the
substance of a man is also part of the self, but perhaps only insofar as the self is
concerned for it.25 The concern Locke speaks of is that of pleasure and pain, such as he
put forth in his initial definition of the self, that affects that body (or substance), material
or immaterial, in which the consciousness resides. Thus, there is a disconnection between
the self as “mind,” and matter as “body.” This separation points to the tendency of the
Colonial American view of the self to be private and detached from nature, especially in
light of religious views that contribute to the understanding that the soul is distinct from
the body –because the mind can be considered other than matter, it also easily regarded as
other than nature.
22

Ibid., II.xxvii.12: 266.
Ibid.
24
Critics argue that Locke’s notion of the self as amalgamation of experiences that one takes to be one’s
own is merely an appropriation theory. But regardless, I agree with Winkler (who argues that, “for Locke,
consciousness of a past act is merely a representation of it as one’s own; it is not knowledge of the preexisting fact that the act was one’s own”) that it is the case that if one admits ownership of experiences or
actions, even if not the actual agent of the activities in question, they do essentially contribute to that self.
ECHU, II.xxvii.20: 271. Also see Locke (Ed. Vere Chappell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),
152-153.
25
Here Locke discusses that if the self resides within a body and the little finger is severed, if the
consciousness goes with the severed finger, then the finger is the person. Should (some) consciousness
enter into the body now separated from the (conscious) finger, it would be a different person, regardless of
what self inhabited the body previously. The self is “inseparable.” (ECHU, II.xxvii.18: 270).
23
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Locke argues that the self, in its concern for pleasure and pain, is also responsible for
the activities involved with actions in the pursuit of happiness, and is directly responsible
for any outcomes attached to the activities of it – herein lies “personhood.” By
demarcating this attachment of self to responsibility, Locke was free to assert that the
term “person,” is used appropriately only in reference to an “intelligent agent, capable of
a law, and happiness, and misery.”26 With this in mind, it is safe to say that Locke
considered only human beings eligible for title of “persons.” As individual entities they
are solely accountable for their own volitions and chosen pursuits, which is to say the
soul should be held accountable for its activities in light of these higher abilities.
Although he did not deny the possibility that the immaterial soul (which as far as we
know resides in the substance best suited for it - the human body), may take residence in
other substances, Locke contended that it seems absurd to suppose that it would.27
Substance is indefinable, according to Locke, in that it is impossible to pinpoint a
specific fundamental property in it that is not changeable and hence, from an
epistemological view we are not directly connected with nature. He realized the necessity
in owing the conscious self a substantial support, but he failed to give a clear and distinct
account of what that might be. Locke attributed the self, perhaps as a result of the
confusion brought forth in defining substance, to consciousness alone. Selective passages
of the Essay subtly point at the soul as the substance in which the consciousness resides,

26

Ibid., II.xxvii.28: 275.
Locke states regarding the consciousness/soul, “Did we know what it was; or how it was tied to a certain
system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and
memory out of a body organized as our is; and whether it has pleased God that no one such spirit shall ever
be united to any but one such body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend;
we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do
(in the dark concerning these matters) the soul of a man for an immaterial substance, independent from
matter…there can be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same soul may at different times be united to
different bodies, and with them make up for that time one man,” (ECHU, II.xxvii.29: 276).

27
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but other passages suggest that the soul is the consciousness. Regardless of his meaning,
the role of substance is superfluous. For this reason, he denied that the substance in which
the self resides can be, or need be, conscious at all times;28 rather, a stream of
consciousness that affords continuous knowledge of unity - that one is the same
individual he or she was yesterday, and for as far back as the individual can remember –
is the key to Locke’s conception of self-identity.
Individual accountability is also born of consciousness, and so Locke maintains, “All
which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of
consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that the self that is
conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or
appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in than if
they had never been done,”29 and so accountability is not overextended, but instead
limited to personal action. Thus, any acts or motives that are unattached to one’s
conscious self are not the responsibility of that person, further promoting the idea that
identity is individual and accountability is equally distributed30 among the members of
those considered persons.31
With progression of age and experience the mind is cultivated. Locke points out
the correlation between magnitude of experience and the complexity of ideas an
individual formulates.32 Thus, we have a conception of the Lockean self developing by
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degree and emerging over time, in accordance with (1) exposure to the external
environment, and; (2) implementation of the operation of reflection; the latter remaining
latent until triggered by the former.33 As such, Locke refused to admit that ideas are
extant before sensation and experience are present; rather, they are “coeval.”34
Locke’s recognized stance that the mind is a tabula rasa35 was important for his
concept of self, and so understanding that sensible experience is the necessary condition
for reflection is imperative. As an empiricist, Locke formulates his concept of self based
not upon the conviction that we are born with innate ideas, as Descartes might argue;
rather, he asserts that we are filled, as one might fill an empty cup, with experiences from
birth – it is a theory of containment.36 As such, the self according to Locke is even more
detached from nature than the self according to Descartes, who is at least aware that
mathematics unites the mind with extension. His method, in the plain historical
tradition,37 takes inventory of the mind and its categories; it is essentially a genetic and
psychological account of our epistemological origin, attributing our mental abilities as
our means of having ideas. We do not know things themselves; rather, we know ideas of
things in the external world. Ideas are, as such, direct and immediate objects of
understanding. Thus, knowledge stems from direct exposure to sensible stimuli and
connection of ideas (upon reflection) in reference to them. It is useful at this juncture to
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note that for Locke, ideas are considered modes of the mind; they are mental entities
dependent on the mind itself. Thus, the only relationship they could have to physical
objects is that of being a representation. Physical things can only be inferred. This notion
is important to grasp in terms of the self, for it implies that the self cannot be inherently
connected to the world. This reinforces the Cartesian dualism that Locke built upon, and
also removes objects of religious belief from direct experience.
The three types, or perhaps more accurately degrees, of knowledge proposed by
Locke are intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive.38 His notion of intuitive knowledge
serves, in a sense, as a replacement for innate ideas or knowledge.39 Intuitive knowledge
allows one to compare and discern ideas in order to determine their agreement or
disagreement.40 Locke explains that no ideas outside those being compared need be
involved in the comparison between the two being discerned; rather, “the mind is at no
pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye does light, only by being
directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a
triangle, that three are more than two and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the
mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition…this kind of
knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of.”41 Locke
denies that this intuitive knowledge is divinely stamped into the mind, but that upon
contemplating two competing ideas, one is endowed with the ability to discern agreement
or disagreement between them. Hence, we know that black is not white due to experience
and learning rather than through some preexisting innate knowledge.
38
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Whereas intuitive knowledge can be known as true or false prior to demonstration,
Locke claims that demonstrative knowledge is less certain: “Thus it is with knowledge
made out by a long train of proof.”42 Demonstrative knowledge employs intuitive
knowledge insofar as agreement between simple ideas is discerned within the proof, but
demonstrative knowledge allows for greater understanding in degree, such as in cases
where immediate perception does not give way to clearness and distinctness. Locke
considers intermediate ideas, or those that require fleshing out in order to determine their
truth, the subject matter of demonstrative knowledge. It is knowledge that is acquired
through the mediation of ideas that are not directly connected, as Locke points out are
necessary in constructing proofs of geometry.43
The third degree of knowledge, sensitive, is described by Locke as the possibility for
the perception, “of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and
consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them.”44 Perception is of
much importance in Locke’s theory, for since our knowledge of the world and our
environment is derived from ideas based upon perceptions, so the extent of our
knowledge necessarily depends upon the clarity of our perceptions about the world; our
knowledge is neither clear nor obscure in itself, for obscure ideas do not produce
knowledge.45
Based upon his threefold theory of knowledge, it is clear that Locke was true to his
emphatically stated assertion at the beginning of his second essay that all knowledge is
42
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traceable back to original empirical experience as the source, and experience is of ideas.
We may say without reservation that the operations of our minds are most fundamentally
involved in true intelligence and knowledge, for the simple perceptions that we receive
from the external world, without reflection, would be nothing more than confused
images; for Locke stated, “Like floating visions they make not deep impressions enough
to leave in their mind clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inward
upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own
contemplation.”46 This “inward turning” Locke describes initially points to an
establishment of the private self as the core of referential activity.
The foundation of the Lockean self as a cognitive mind has been laid out, and we now
have a vision of an accountable being capable of conscious, intelligent activity,
perceiving and reflecting, and residing in a substance, concerned with that substance
insofar as it is an operational constituent of the self-serving as a means for mobility,
pleasure and avoidance of pain, and pursuit of needs, desires, and happiness. The mind is
separate from the world, including the body. The implications of Locke’s epistemology
leave us unconnected with nature, and our ideas only represent the world. Thus, our
primary relation to nature is as an epistemological object.
This concept of self, however, is adequate only ceteris paribus; the self is a
necessarily social being, and must be further developed as such in order to acquire a firm
understanding of how the cultivated dialogical self is actualized as the core of referential
activity. The extent of the self’s knowledge lies in the clarity of ideas based upon
perceptions of one’s environment, and consequently the culture in which one is
immersed. One’s environment certainly includes relationships to others, community,
46
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values, and societal norms. As such, although it isn’t feasible to do a full analysis of
Colonial life for the purposes of this paper, it is important to evaluate some cultural
aspects of Colonial American mind to understand the self more completely. Because the
shaping of the American minds of the time was greatly influenced by Lockean thought,
this assessment will be closely based upon the second of his Two Treatises of
Government.

Part 4: Political Self
The characteristics of the relationships between individual selves with others and
their environment are expressions of a culture. The culture of Colonial America was
strongly influenced not only by Locke’s thought,47 but also Christianity and the
Enlightenment.48 Colonists were drawn to America by the possibilities that awaited them,
and were motivated by the opportunity to freely practice their religions, shape their lives
in accordance with their desires to own and work their own land, and perhaps most
importantly, achieve and maintain the status of prime benefactors of the fruits of their
labor, which is still pertinent to what we consider the “American Dream” today. In short,
they were drawn to the possibility of realizing their potentials for a better life. In the
struggle for autonomy from English rule, the colonies saw philosophers especially
concerned with virtue in governance (moral and political philosophy being closely
interwoven),49 but also in individual character in both public and private life;50 thus, the
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goal was to create a culture where self-construction was possible,51 yet bounded enough
that government need not be overly limiting, allowing for the greatest possible individual
autonomy.
Colonial Americans were concerned with the self (and the development thereof) not
strictly in the sense of existence as a simple or solitary persona, but perhaps more
accurately as a necessarily social being influenced by culture, not exclusive of the degree
of governmental organization and control present within that culture. Yet, the self was
inherently individual for the Colonial. As aforementioned, the strong Christian
underpinnings that influence Colonial thought and action played a strong role in how the
individual viewed himself, for Christianity provided a distinction between soul and body.
This distinction is basically an internal/external dualism; deeply engrained in the Colonial
concept of self, it involves paying attention to the development of the private, individual
soul. Thus, one’s internal nature was focused on the self as a subjective entity, and
relationships outside of the self are external. Accordingly, one’s freedom was an
indispensable concern for the Colonial American.
Individual freedom was of supreme importance; this is a notion Locke attended to in
his political work. It seems only natural that the beginning point of discourse in Locke’s
Second Treatise addressed the fundamental nature of man, which is essential to any
theory of government or morality, and as such, to the conception of self. Locke was
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concerned with the state of nature of men according to the “Law of Nature,”52 as equal
with each other and not “depending on the Will of any other Man”53 Man is autonomous,
or should be autonomous, and the law that Locke speaks of is reason.54
For the Colonial American, ownership was highly motivating; the primary
relationship of the individual to aspects of himself, things in nature – in the world, and
other individuals, was understood in terms of ownership or non-ownership. Macpherson
writes, “The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social
whole, but as an owner of himself,”55 a notion true to Locke’s theory. This was made
clear by his centered attention on the subject of rights to possession in his Second
Treatise; ownership played a fundamental role in the legitimization of men’s rights as
autonomous entities.
Locke described freedom, as the “Foundation of all the rest [of man’s rights];”56
anyone who attempts to enslave another threatens the very core of what it is to be human.
One is free if and only if one has complete self-ownership; a threat to the former is
identical with a threat to the latter. Furthermore, Locke clarified that, “No man can, by
agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over his own
life.”57 Here Locke appeals to Christianity; he points out that one is incapable of
enslaving one’s self to another. This belief clearly stems from the conviction that only
God has supreme power over mankind, but in His goodness He has granted men non-
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transferrable self-ownership in the sense that one is “bound (by God) to preserve
himself.”58 Hence, suicide is also mentioned and discouraged by Locke.59
Locke’s thought appealed to men of both religious and secular persuasions in his
discussion of property,60 though this was probably not his main goal.61 He states at the
beginning of Chapter V, “Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, that Men,
being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink,
and such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence: Or Revelation, which gives
us an account of those Grants God made of the World to Adam, [it is given] to Mankind
in common.”62 Thus, whether one was won over by faith or reason mattered not, because
Locke effectively covered all of his bases. He was free to proceed with discussion of how
there might be rights to personal property in an environment that was deemed “common”
to all alike.
The term self-ownership also includes any and all labor proffered by individuals, as
well as the fruits of that labor. Locke summed up this idea in the following:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man
has a Property in his own Person. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his
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Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State
that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him
removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that
is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others.63
Once labor is mingled with common property, it is no longer considered common, for it
is not purely of Nature anymore. He justified this notion by explaining that labor is of
greater value than uncultivated nature.64
Locke saw nature as abundant; nevertheless, there was a limit to what one may
properly appropriate to self and family without violating the rights of other men. As such,
he pointed out that there were plenty of resources and property to allow for each to take
what he needed, but anything in excess of what is needed immediately would be
considered an infringement upon others. This was not necessarily the case where storage
was an option, and should the goods remain useful for personal needs; but, when keeping
provisions or property beyond that which was required for subsistence or if spoiling
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occurred, one was guilty of taking in excess of what was rightfully his.65 In fact, it was
punishable to allow spoilage to occur.66
Of course, provisions obtained from common land or water, although not belonging
directly to one (as a field that has been plowed and planted), were considered rightful
possessions due to the labor that was involved in retrieving them, and this was the case
for all mankind. For example Locke explains, “Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer,
that Indian’s who hath killed it; ‘tis allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour
upon it, though before, it was the common right of every one…and by virtue thereof,
what Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that great and still remaining Common of
Mankind…[is] made his Property who takes that pains about it.”67 Hence, even if
provisions were found in the “common” they were fair game for anyone that acquired it
through his labor. Logically speaking, if one took more than he needed, it followed that
the excess was rightfully someone else’s.68 Locke claimed that if these guidelines are
respected, then there is enough for everyone’s comfort, whether land, game, or other
provisions.69
It is not the quantity of possessions that Locke was concerned with, but the
destruction of provisions through the misappropriation of perishables.70 Locke pointed
out that the solution to the problem of owning more than can be used is money. Tully
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points out that, “Locke contrasts usefulness with various kinds of conventional value.
Useless things, such as gold, silver and diamonds receive their value from ‘Fancy or
Agreement’, that is, ‘from the consent of Men’.”71 Now, whereas previously men were
required to find use72 for the fruit of their labor lest it spoil, agreement upon the use of
money negates the constraint for men to own more of the earth than their needs require,
as formerly prescribed under the ‘Rule of Propriety’. Thus, “Men have agreed to
disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth.”73
Hence, according to Locke there is justification for owning more than anyone actually
needs for private use. The agreement of men to use money was and still remains the
means to acquiring much more than what is necessary for mere sustainability of life.
Money provides a convenience that bartering does not, and effectively lifts the burden of
use before spoilage, such that if one cultivates or procures more provisions than can be
properly made useful before spoiling, one is not required to relinquish the commodities
but may retain the value of their labor by exchanging them for money, which is beneficial
to both the laborer and the buyer.

Part 5: The Colonial American Self
The Colonial American self, based upon the foundation of Lockean thought, was one
in which the epistemic self was private and separate from nature. It was aware of the
passions that have the capability of overpowering reason, which is the difference between
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man and beast.74 The epistemic self also allows for the ability to perceive one’s needs and
understanding that allows for industrial use of the body in order to obtain what is required
for sustaining the self overall. The self has reflective power, and as an intelligent agent,
also possesses accountability. This accountability is employed in the State of Nature,
which is one of equality, where the rights of one man are no greater or lesser than
another’s.
In order to carve out a place in a world of others striving to do the same, one must
find a way to coexist with others seeking to fulfill the same needs. Looking for the most
comfortable way of life possible in a culture where others must be respected in order to
maintain peace required attention to individual rights of both the self and the other whom
we share nature, and at base, survival, with. Nature is our sole means of survival, and
Colonials clung to the possibility of indemnifying their own survival by means of
procurement; ownership of property through the mingling of nature with labor was the
most lucrative means for living comfortably.
Locke certainly dealt with the justification for private ownership of nature that is
deemed “common” to all. The ideas he raised regarding land and provisions were
elemental in America, which was considered uncivilized and untamed; it was viewed as
“there for the taking,” and an exciting opportunity, with hard work, to thrive. He was not,
however, naïve to the fact that there are limits to the distribution of nature; in his native
England he was certainly aware of vast estates and the role of capitalism in society.
Macpherson explains that Locke’s validation of the unequal distribution of land and
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resources is based on the fundamental rights of man,75 although perhaps not an issue that
emerged immediately in the early stages of new society in a new land. There is, as this is
certainly true today, a point where land is distributed unequally, although justly so in
accordance with the tacit agreement of men to use money, which was arguably
established in the “state of nature.”76 Hence, capitalism is a necessary part of society that
serves as a way to deal with land distribution and resources that are not infinitely
unlimited. Profits, whether in the form of land, provisions, or money, are made possible
through societal living, but according to the Christian belief of the time, they were best
reinvested in the public arena.77
Again, we can see the externality of the Colonial American relationship with others as having relation to other people by way of rights and obligations, and relation to nature
as property. The private self, as a reasonable, intelligent creature, was concerned with
development of the self. But best use of outward self should be taken up with labor and
productivity in service to God as well as for subsistence of the self in order to continue
this service. Furthermore, there was nothing immoral, Christian or not, in having unequal
75
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distribution of property and provisions. Locke promoted this notion, and Macpherson
writes:
His doctrine of property appears in a new light…For on his view his insistence that a
man’s labour was his own – which was the essential novelty of Locke’s doctrine of
property – has almost the opposite significance from that more generally attributed to
it in recent years; it provides a moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation…If it is
labour, a man’s absolute property, which justifies appropriation and creates value, the
individual right of appropriation overrides any moral claims of the society. The
traditional view that property and labour were social functions, and that ownership of
property involved social obligations, is thereby undermined.78
Thus, with property and labor divorced from moral or social obligation, there was a sense
of self much separated from the rest of society, as was the case with nature as well.
As with Lockean thought, the heavy influence of Puritanical ethics in Colonial life
also promoted ownership, appealing to natural rights, although in a bit more obscure
manner. According to Perry Miller, “Employing an estate so that it should become a
larger estate was the inescapable injunction.”79 The Puritans believed that hard work was
required of them – it is commanded by God. Miller indicates that, according to Samuel
Willard, “‘Man is made for Labour, and not for Idleness’”, ergo, God has not given
possessions to be held in common, ‘but hath appointed that every Man should have his
Share in them, wherein he holds a proper Right in them, and they are his own and not
anothers.’ This principle, Willard pointed out – as did all Puritans – has nothing to do
with the spiritual condition; a right to property, exercised within civil propriety, is as
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valid for the pagan or idolater as for the saint.”80 Reward in the form of wealth or land
was merely an incidental of performing one’s duty to God, but should not be the focus of
laboring. The temptation that comes with profit, according to John Cotton, is something
to be resisted.81
In any case, the Colonial self was a private being, separate from others and nature.
The self was the core of referential activity, relying on reason and reflection upon
personal experience to formulate ideas about the world. Inner dialogue occurs between
the private and public self, and as can be seen in Locke’s writing, there was concern with
negotiating the private self properly into the outside world. This outside world consists of
others, of culture, nature, and is a necessarily social atmosphere; hence, the self must
constantly be aware of boundaries – whether self-imposed, religiously imposed, or
governmentally imposed.
Essentially, the Colonial American self took on what might be dubbed an “I-It”
relationship to the rest of the non-human world, as described by Austrian born Jewish
philosopher, Martin Buber .82 The fundamentals of this attitude are described in the
following words that he wrote in his book entitled, I and Thou. Buber explains:
I perceive something. I am sensible of something. I imagine something. I will
something. I feel something. I think something. The life of human beings does not
consist of all this and the like alone. This and the like together establish the realm of
It…The Man Who Experiences has not part in the world. For it is “in him” and not
between him and the world that the experience arises. The world has no part in the
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experience. It permits itself to be experienced, but has no concern in the matter. For it
does nothing to the experience, and the experience does nothing to it.”83
Thus, Buber describes the relationship of the “I-It” oriented man to the rest of the nature
as one that consists in a fundamental separation. Robert Wood, in his Analysis of I and
Thou, adds, “He lives for himself…He constantly interposes his subjective designs
between himself and reality and thus becomes incapable of listening and responding to
whatever might meet him out of the situation. The world merely mirrors back to him his
own desires. He takes his stand in his bodily difference from all others and defines all
things in relation to himself.”84
Of course, this type of relationship with the rest of the world takes on, although
perhaps inadvertently, a stance of opposition. This certainly has implications for how the
“I-It” man treats others, land, and nature. Thomas Paine pointed out, in fact, that the
desires of the individual and civil society are conflicting, perhaps even contradictory.85
Hence, the private self - the inner mind that is separated from matter - relating most
closely to nature as “owner,” must be cosseted; government is the means for this
protection. Locke’s message did not set the self free from authority, but it offered new
hope for the highest possible level of autonomy that the private Colonial self could hope
for. It has been written that, “[Locke’s] influence in the history of thought, on the way we
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think about ourselves and our relations to the world we live in, to God, nature and
society, has been immense.”86
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CHAPTER 2
THE NATIVE AMERICAN SELF
“The I of the primary word I-Thou makes its appearance as person and becomes
conscious of itself as subjectivity (without a dependent genitive).”
--Martin Buber, I and Thou

Native American cultures have a very unique view of the self in contrast to the
European one. In this chapter I will discuss the basic premises that I have found to
underlie the constitution of the Native American self before comparing and contrasting it
with the Colonial American self-concept in the following chapter. Since there are many
Native American cultures, I will aim to describe a common feature of what sort of self
can be found across many of them. I have chosen to focus on sources written by
Muskogee Creek, Crow, and Seneca tribe members.1 Most Native American knowledge
is passed on through storytelling, or an oral tradition, so it is useful for the purposes of
this paper to view the stories as a means for garnering information about their selfbeliefs. A common and prominent thread that runs through many Native American stories
is the importance that is placed on relationships. This interest in relationships is
especially unique due to the meaning that underlies the term others in many Native
American cultures, which is taken to include cognitive beings, but also animals, plants,
and even inanimate things. It is my intent in this chapter to show that the Native
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American self is, above all, relational, and that this self specifically attributes qualities to
others from the standpoint of an equal.
The standpoint of relation is assumed by tribal members as a result of education in
their own culture through listening to stories. Moreover, the relating of stories, myths,
and values through words is not merely a one-sided event because it requires both the
activity of speaking and, just as importantly, the activity of listening. The process of oral
tradition is important for understanding a Native American concept of self in that it
actually connects speakers and listeners to the land, animals, forefathers, and each other –
to all of nature in general – by nurturing participants in a way that encourages an ongoing
dialogue with others. I intend to show that the attitudes that have been passed on through
generations by way of oral tradition are saturated with what I take to be fundamental
Native American values of equality, reciprocity, community, and cooperation; all of these
contributing to the taking of what shall be dubbed a “thou attitude” toward the rest of
nature. Thus, in order to further develop the idea of a relational self, I will draw upon
various stories, myths, and ceremonies that Native American cultures have accepted as
their histories for thousands of years, as well as other sources about and by Native
Americans.2

Part 1: The Influence of Oral Tradition on Self-Concept
The wisdom that passes in the oral tradition from generation to generation is rich with
underlying meanings that promote the values of the culture in which they are treasured.
They are, “told and retold, reshaped and refitted to meet their audience’s changing
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needs,”3 but these tales most often are of fictional status.4 Yet there are sacred tales and
ceremonies that are not altered, but the way many legends are related depend upon the
tribe or group narrating.5 In such cases, it is said that, “The legend is a thing, to the Indian
mind, and it has a certain personality. In certain instances the legend is a personal or
group possession and its form and content are religiously guarded from change.”6 The
actual storytelling itself is a practice rich with customs, including those that the teller
follows as well as listeners.7 We will find that the Native American self is defined by the
very relationships that are conveyed throughout their narrations, and that the feelings and
memories evoked and shared as a result form the framework from which the self-concept
arises.
Among those who have endeavored to retell Native American tales in written form is

G áw asow aneh (or, “Big Snowsnake”)8, otherwise known as Arthur Casewell Parker,
who had Seneca ancestry by paternal blood ties was fascinated by and entertained a
lifelong interest in Indian folk tales.9 Although many tales are entertaining, the purpose of
them is not to be understood solely as such; rather, they are a means of looking into the
“life story” of Native Americans.10 According to Native American scholar Donald Fixico,
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who was raised in the Seminole and Muscogee Creek traditions,11 the role of storytelling
can be explained in the following way:
Story is the basis of American Indian oral tradition. Story is the vehicle for sharing
traditional knowledge and passing it from one generation to the next. Its purposes
include sharing information, providing lessons in morality, confirming identity, and
telling experiences of people. Stories sometimes tell us the future. Powerful and
vivid, each account is an entity of power. When the story is told effectively, it
transcends time, as traditional knowledge lives on with each new listener becoming a
part of them and a part of the next generation.12
Fixico indicates that the importance of the oral tradition lies in the felt emotions as they
are experienced by listeners and narrators, bringing the history and values closer to real
experience.13
It can be quite difficult, however, for unfamiliar readers and listeners to pinpoint the
main theme or gist of many stories; as such, difficulty for non-Native Americans lies in
cross-cultural translation and interpretation.14 But it is the case that, like most stories we
are familiar with, Native American tales have a minimum of five aspects, according to
Fixico: “Time, place, character(s), event, and purpose. Together, they are the sum of an
experience. Each part connects the other parts for the storyteller to weave his or her story
to imagination and to explain by symbols what it otherwise could not express.” I agree with the former
portion of his request, but beg to differ on the latter, (SMFT, xxiii-xxiv).
11
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in the art of storytelling that is poetry and fine entertainment and knowledge sharing in
Indian Communities.”15 These five aspects of the story draw the listener into the event
that is being narrated, and he or she recognizes and/or assimilates the values and
traditions of ancestors that are conveyed into his or her own set of personal beliefs. The
stories essentially become part of the listeners’ own experiences, at the same time serving
as a means for teaching young listeners how to act and what attitudes to hold in regard to
others, as well as one’s self. Engaging with others during a narration, and experiencing
the responses and attitudes of peers during a story, rather than reading written words in
private, draws listeners and speakers together as they experience the unfolding of events
together.
The stories conveyed in the oral tradition are very like those of everyday
experiences,16 often involving contexts of hunting and fishing, routine daily activities,
and family situations. The Native American self identifies with not only ancestors and
other community members as an integral part of the oral tradition, but also with the
mythical beings that often star in many stories. Thus, these entities also relate the values
and attitudes that listeners identify as tribal mores, and the feeling of community is
strengthened with each narrative. Thus one’s cultural, and furthermore world-view, is
formed and situated through these oral interactions, as the listeners essentially relive
historical and value-laden events with each telling. Hence, it can be said quite accurately
that historical events are actually experienced alongside other tribe members, via
narrative participation.
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Fixico explains the importance of relating stories orally, rather than in written word,
accordingly, “Narrative and oral tradition help to build an oral history for accounting for
the past of a community. They tell us about the social, everyday life of people. Instead of
writing about Indian people from the window of a library or archives using historical
documents, oral tradition and listening to stories allows people to feel and become a part
of the past and sharing a sense of time and place with the people.”17 The oral tradition,
employing the memories of all involved in the process, brings the group together as a
community, and unifies them by allowing them to share a common experience through
the narration. Children learn through seeing their elders’ reactions to actions that are
taken by mythical characters in stories, and come to understand how they should
approach and what they should feel under similar circumstances.
All emotions that are evoked are shared through the listening process, and a feeling of
relatedness with the other listeners (as well as those spirits that emerge from within the
story being told) creates what Fixico refers to as, “an energy.”18 He writes, “The objects
themselves emit an energy, as each possesses a spirit. Among Indian people, it is known
that each item has a story about it such as how a bowl of pottery was made…and each
event encapsulates a story and the object created, giving it life and energy as the source
for spirituality. Within the object is soul which comes alive with each story that is told
about the object and retold.” Familial (as well as relationships with the spirits that emerge
17
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in stories), tribal, and perhaps most importantly the community bonds, are strengthened
as a result of active listening.
The community bond is of great interest to Native American culture, because
community health and strength are seen as having much greater importance than the
status of the individual.19 It did not escape their attention that quality of life is directly
related to an optimally functional community, and a community is only as strong as the
relationships that fund it. According to historian Stanley Worton:
Because they relied on nature for their existence and because they could not regulate
it, they [American Indians] formed a cooperative way of life in order to work in
harmony with it. Traditions, as taught by the elders, who were considered wise and all
knowing, were accepted and followed by the younger generation. Individual acts of
bravery, courage, and endurance were admired, but cooperation, sharing, and strong
family and tribal ties were the very lifeblood of the survival of society.20
The constant cooperation and communication with the whole of nature suggests that the
Native American self is externally oriented, or situated within the context of its
relationships and the role it plays in the web of community, rather than extant as merely a
private and individual entity. Fixico points out that, “The Wintu Indians of California
philosophized that a person belonged to the society rather than the person and society
being two separate entities. The Wintu people preferred to be a part of a community…[A]
cultural genesis is initiated, therefore, with the process of interrelationships of the
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elements of people, family, and community, thus producing a balance of the themes in
the community with nature.”21

Part 2: Extension of “Thouness”
The main characters in Native American lore may seem diverse, or perhaps even
unexpected to non-Native readers. The reason for this is due to an elemental gap between
European and Native American thought: many Native Americans understand that not
only humans, but also plants, animals, and inanimates (all believed to be endowed with
sacred energies), as well as supernaturals who visit in visions and dreams, are all not only
extant, but active members of their communities.22 On the contrary, in European thought
it is held that in order to be a functioning part of community one must be no less than a
reasonable, thinking human being. Thus, Native American communities (again,
consisting not only of humans but of all natural entities) are viewed as parts of an
interconnected web of energy, wherein there exist connections between all entities in
nature thereby creating a harmony or balance in nature.23
But how do American Indians know that other selves, whether human or non-human
in nature, exist in spiritual24 form? The answer is in an ongoing communication with
nature. Spirits’ existences are often made apparent in dreams and visions, wherein they
visit the dreamer and disclose information - often messages about the future. These
visitors exist for them as reality; the dreamer, who has communicated with nature and
21
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listened to their stories time and again, does not necessarily consider them strangers.
Fools Crow, in conversation about visiting with the “Higher Powers,” claims that
“Wakan-Tanka has given me the power to travel in the spirit to where they are, and I go
and talk with them,”25 indicating that he is able to utilize the powers of the Higher Ones
and his own power to actually communicate with spirits. Fixico also discusses this ability
and its meaning for Native Americans, saying, “The causes of action are a part of the
physical and metaphysical realities of native people. Furthermore, metaphysical beings
can cause things to occur in the physical world, but not vice versa. For this reason,
American Indians highly value the metaphysical world, and thus believe that it is more
powerful than the physical dimension of their world.”26
The role of what Iroquois call orenda, which has parallels to other tribes, plays a
prodigious role in Native American culture. Its meaning helps us understand why the
extension of “persons” to such an array of entities is completely necessary in accordance
with their metaphysical beliefs. Thus, for a fuller discussion of what a Native American
self-concept might be, it important to understand the term “orenda,” which will be used
from here forward. But it should also be noted that no matter the term, the concept
attached is found throughout Native American culture.27 According to Holly:
An orenda is sacred, not entirely predictable to humans, and mysterious; hence it
behooves humans to approach all orendas with respect and with reciprocal courtesies.
Each creature or entity is conceived of and experienced as a Thou, in the terminology
of Martin Buber, as having personhood albeit a non-human sort of personhood if a
25
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non-human, rather than being conceived and experienced as an It, or merely a tool for
human purposes…every creature and entity is sacred and is seen as playing an
essential role in nature, in its own right, regardless of human purposes.28
Thus, orenda may be conceived of as a sort of energy or spirit that inhabits whatever it so
chooses. According to Parker, “Spirits pervade all nature and affect man for good or evil.
Their desires and plans must be satisfied by man. There are both good and evil spirits.
Spirits may inhabit anything in nature.”29 The possibility for spirits or sacred energy to
inhabit any object in nature has vast implications for the definition of what it means to be
a “person” for Native Americans.
The actual terms used in other languages that are basically equivalents of orenda,
which in speech vary depending upon the tribe - but in definition remain fairly constant,
are deeply embedded within the thoughts, activities, and perhaps most importantly in the
daily language of tribe members. Linguist Benjamin Whorf’s findings support the
significance of the term’s usage in everyday language as such: because the names and
stories (of mythic and spiritual entities or energies) are present within the language, they
are constantly at the forefront of thought and are thus active in shaping perceptions.30
The Lakota Indians use the word “wakan” to refer to the energy-power of beings
in much the same way the Iroquois use “orenda”.31 Lakota holy man, Fools Crow, in
dialogue with Thomas Mails discussed the importance of relationships with “others” in
the sense that has been discussed. When asked if he believed that rocks or earth has
feelings, he responded that, “If everything that has been created is essential to life and
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balance and harmony, then they do. It depends on how you think and how you define life.
If you believe something has life, it has life. Wakan-Tanka has taught us to think about
creation this way, and when we do, the life all things have within them becomes apparent
to us, and we treat them accordingly.”32 When asked if he thought the sun was a god,
Fools Crow declared that the sun was most certainly a Person – more precisely, a holy
being, for he asked, “Can life exist and continue without it?”33 It is apparent throughout
his dialogue with Mails that Fools Crow’s people, like those in most other tribes, regard
personhood or “Thouness” as something sacred – as something much more than a
condition reserved solely for humanity. This extension (from a European view, at least) is
woven into the fabric of Native American thought, especially through the oral tradition,
and as such it magnifies the principle that Native American self-conception is best
described as having its basis in relationships.
Relationships are potentially unlimited in Native American culture. The role of man
within creation is just one of many, for each non-human entity is equally endowed with
power to keep the balance of natural energies. The concept behind this harmony is
cyclical; there is a reciprocity that exists between all things, and Native American
“religion”34 seeks to, “determine the proper relationship that the people of the tribe must
have with other living things and to develop the self-discipline within the tribal
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community so that man acts harmoniously with other creatures.”35 What does it mean for
them to live harmoniously with nature? Nature essentially speaks to the Native American,
keenly aware of the signs and signals that are conveyed throughout nature. Again, we see
the importance of oral tradition; the skill of listening is sharpened, and the interest in
listening to nature has already been fostered from little on.
Listen to nature…is the wooly worm especially wooly, or the tail of the squirrel
particularly thick this fall? If so, a hard winter can be expected and certain preparations
should be made. With special attention to their surroundings and keen awareness of the
unity that exists with the rest of nature, Native Americans make listening to nature so
much a part of their lives, it is difficult to imagine otherwise.36 In order to survive, the
self takes an approach to nature as such: she is speaking to me, and I must actively listen
in order to hear her. Listening is not merely a one-sided form of communication; it is an
activity that creates emotional ties to the surrounding environment that allows one to
understand what actions are appropriate for the common welfare of all.

The need and ability to communicate, to have a real relationship with nature, is
evidenced by the belief that all things have their own definite energy or “Thouness.”
Deloria notes a specific example in the words of Canadian Stoney Indian, Walking
Buffalo, who asks, “Did you know that trees talk? Well they do. They talk to each other,
and they’ll talk to you if you listen. Trouble is, white people don’t listen. They never
learned to listen to the Indians, so I don’t suppose they’ll listen to other voices in nature.
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But I have learned a lot from trees; sometimes about the weather, sometimes about
animals, sometimes about the Great Spirit.”37 Walking Buffalo’s words indicate a close
fellowship with nature based on a fundamental holistic understanding of the surrounding
environment, and demonstrates the Native American self as unified with the rest of
creation.
And these relationships are not exclusive to inhabitants of the tangible world, for
there is deep-seated spirituality and belief in non-physical entities that are not just
potentially extant, but truly actual. Overholt and Callicott support this premise with the
following:
The impression of a broader than human social world is strengthened by the
frequency with which the characters of the myths undergo metamorphosis, though the
narratives are not terribly explicit about how all of this is possible…what is important
for our purposes, however, is that the narratives simply assume that this is the way
reality is, a fact that the attentive reader is likely to find both obvious and puzzling.38
Through excerpts of Ojibwa tales in Clothed in Fur, we read of ghosts, dreams, and even
metamorphosis. In a particular tale involving beavers that are willing to become food for
humans, it is made clear39 that the willingness is due to the mutual respect that is
reciprocal in the relationship between humans and animals.
Should humans disrespect the beaver’s bodies through being wasteful or by breaking
their stripped bones after consumption, the beaver will come back deformed as a result. 40
37
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By desecrating the remains of the animal, the hunter is violating the relationship between
himself and the animal entities, and the animals will refuse to allow men to catch them.
This notion is intriguing in itself, but especially in the sense that humans are certainly not
attributed with having control over the beavers or any other part of nature; rather, the
actions of the human as an equal determine the success of his survival and subsistence.
Furthermore, the life of the animal is not over, though it potentially can be, once it has
relinquished itself. Hence, it is concerned with the way humans treat it.
Animals consider offerings from humans a sign of respect; the humans will remain in
their graces and the animals will consider giving themselves up as food if “asked.” If the
remains have been properly respected, the animal will come back; if treated improperly,
it will come back either deformed or perhaps not at all.41 The possibility of complete
death is detrimental not only to the animal, but the human who will eventually need
replenishment of sustenance that comes in the form of returning animals; the
consequence of non-return is born by both parties. And further, respect toward animal
beings must also include “the proper attitude,” which is essentially, “the prohibition
against thinking disparaging thoughts about the one upon whom you depend.”42 This
notion is important because it places the Native American self in a position that is
certainly not one of complete power; rather, humans are seen as “pitiable” receivers of
blessings, and this based upon his or her conduct and treatment of other non-human
“persons” that are depended upon for survival.43
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We are afforded a glimpse of American Indian beliefs about life and death through
the story about the beavers: life is not necessarily over when human or animal persons
die, and hence the concern over how remains are treated. But the significance lies in this
belief: there is no “otherworldly” realm in which spirits exist; they continue to live in this
world and communicate with the inhabitants herein. The communication and
involvement with deceased beings, in whatever form they assume, will continue to
influence natural order. In another Ojibwa tale wherein snapping turtles go to war against
caddice flies, death is merely a state from which the animals can be revived.44 Upon
being slain by the enemy, another member of the casualty’s kind may “breathe upon” the
victim, and that animal is restored “looking the same as before.”45 Overholt and Callicott
denote this story as an example of, “the fluidity of the line between life and death” that is
observed in the tradition.46

In the story of Mary Jemison, who was a captive of the

Senecas at a young age and then adopted into their society, we read of sisters who mourn
for a brother slain in battle:47
Our brother, our brother, alas! He is gone! But why do we grieve for his loss? In the
strength of a warrior, undaunted he left us, to fight by the side of the Chiefs…with
glory he fell, and his spirit went up to the land of his fathers in war! Then why do we
mourn? With transports of joy they received him, and fed him, and clothed him, and
welcomed him there! Oh friends, he is happy; then dry up your tears! His spirit has
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seen our distress, and sent us a helper (Mary Jemison) whom with pleasure we
greet…in the place of our brother she stands in our tribe.48
Mary’s story illustrates the ongoing relationship that the grieving women maintain with
their brother. While it is a shock that he will no longer be with them in physical form,
they are keenly aware that his spirit continues, and continues to provide for them. This
reinforces the idea that he will continue on within their world, and his relationships with
others also continues as they “feed, clothe, and welcome” him into their midst. The
deceased brother is by no means disconnected from others.
Hartley Burr Alexander, in his book The World’s Rim, explains that, “Life and death
are not separate but confluent in Indian lore.”49 It is important to note in the preceding
narrative that the sisters do not even question the reality of their brother’s life after death
in spiritual form – including the need for their brother to have provisions such as food
and clothing. This suggests that it is not merely speculation that perhaps he has moved on
and lives in some other realm or dimension, but that there is still a distinct place for him
in their society as a person, although perhaps not in the tangible sense. In their reality,
their brother is still actual; they may be unable to touch or see him, but he still needs
physical rudiments like clothing, food, and the companionship of relatives in order to be
comfortable. He still provides for them (he sends Mary to fill the void created when he
left).
It is thus no wonder that Deloria recognizes the “notable absence of the fear of death”
in American Indian tribal religions;50 relationships with deceased loved ones continue
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throughout the unfolding of loved one’s lives. For example, the burial mounds that hold
the remains of individuals are also filled with articles of everyday living such as food,
clothing, and tools, pointing to the belief that the life of the deceased is not only fully
expected to continue, but no less than in the manner it was lived previously.51 Deloria
remembers a woman who placed an orange on the grave of a loved one at burial, and
upon being asked by the officiating Episcopalian priest when she expected the deceased
to eat the orange, she replied, “When the soul comes to smell the flowers!”52 Hence, for
the American Indian self, death is not something to be feared, rather revered as a natural
part of the circle of life that continues. It is not a disconnection from loved ones, and the
relationship is not lost but maintains a continuity.
The stages of life between birth and death; the changing of the seasons from winter to
spring and summer to fall, and back again; the generation and decay of vegetation and
eventual regeneration – all of these processes have continuity. This continuity and the
cyclical way that nature operates did not escape the keen observation of Native
Americans. Their logic and philosophy is founded upon the circle, and Fixico explains,
“Nature repeated itself in a continuous series of cycles and seasons of circular
patterns…Cherokee elder Dhyani Ywahoo observed that in Tsalagi (Cherokee) world
view, life and death, manifestation and formlessness, are all within the circle, which
spirals out through all dimensions.”53 Thus the self is ongoing no matter what its state,
and constantly in communication with others and with nature as part of the whole of
creation.

51

Ibid.
Ibid., 171.
53
AIM, 50.
52

47

This constant communication even occurs during sleep in the form of dreams,
reinforcing the relationships that have been established over lifetimes, through
experiences, and through oral tradition and ceremonies. Dreams’ functions are of special
importance to the Native American self in several ways: (1) as a means of contact with
“other than human” persons, thereby validating these entities’ existences; (2) as a means
of obtaining power and knowledge about the future (they play a key role in young men’s
rites of passage),54 and; (4) dreams reinforce the structure of inner control.55 Upon
considering any of the above points, it is understandable why dreams and visions have a
much more significant role in Native American than in Western culture. Overholt and
Callicott explain that Western culture holds dreams as “reflective” of waking life, and
useful perhaps in uncovering what the subconscious may be up to in such a sense, but by
Native American standards they are an actual “category” of experience.56
In other words, if an experience is remembered, regardless of whether the one
experiencing is awake or asleep, it is still considered, “a part of actual past history.”57
The conversations and relationships that develop during dreams are considered very real,
not merely figments of the psyche that emerge haphazardly. The exchanges that occur
between the dreamer and the entities that appear in dreams are given great credence and
regarded as invaluable for determining what types of decisions and paths should be
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chosen in waking life. Thus, dreams essentially validate relationships and activities
performed while awake by functioning as additional channels of communication with
guiding supernatural entities. The importance of dreams further augments the idea of a
“relational” conception of the self, due to the reliance upon the venerated advice of those
entities in order to keep the spiritual energy in harmony with the rest of nature.

Part 3: Significance of Land
As discussed previously, there are five aspects to every Native American story;
however, there is one aspect of lore that is particularly outstanding within American
Indian culture: place. Over and above all else “place” is prominent, serving a referential
purpose in that specific landmarks, trees, rivers, paths, and any other type of geological
formations that can be found in the environment serve as, Fixico asserts, reminders of
sacred places and true lived experiences that have become interwoven in the fabric of that
community through oral narratives; accordingly, “In this way, every place has a story
relating to human experience.”58 In fact, a tribe’s history is directly related to its location
rather than being referenced by any chronological sequence of events, although prediscovery chronology can be roughly established if desired.59 But time is not so relevant
to their stories, rather, “What appears to have survived as a tribal conception of history
almost everywhere was the description of conditions under which the people lived and
the location in which they lived.”60
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It would be improper to imply that there exists a disconnection between relationships
with tribal “lands” and relationships with “persons.” Holly indicates that, “Tribal lands
were occupied collectively on the basis of human kinship groupings as well as spiritual
contract with the orendas on that land.”61 She is essentially pointing to the blurred line
that exists between persons and places in Native American thought – this due to the
extension of personhood to non-living and non-human entities in nature. Like the orenda
of other animal and non-animal persons, during physical life the human spirit is tied to
the locations it hunts, lives on, explores and travels, and generally experiences life. Just
the same, it is understood that the spirits of humans continue to dwell in native lands even
after physical life is over. Deloria indicates that this is one reason for the reluctance to
give up land to the whites; their relatives and community members were still very much
present on the lands, and they feared dishonor would be suffered by their loved ones
through improper treatment by the whites.62
Rather than merely a place to inhabit, land is revered in the sense that it nurtures. The
relationship is not simply one that is born from agent to location; rather, it is reciprocal. It
would be absurd to assume that land is something that can or should be privately owned,
or any other natural resources for that matter. Often referred to as Mother (or
Grandmother) Earth, she is the condition for the possibility of survival itself. She also
comforts as a mother, and provides the means for renewal of spirit when the self becomes
imbalanced. In order to renew the spirit, one returns to familiar surroundings to revitalize
the soul. It is said that, “During this return to renewal of spiritual energy, a person asks
deep questions of his or her being. One’s natural surroundings become like nature’s
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womb for security as the struggle for balance is analyzed by the individual.”63 Holly
affirms the special relationship that Native Americans have with their lands, relating that,
“As Sioux medicine man Lame Deer and others have pointed out, it seemed to traditional
Indians quite crazy and impious to buy and sell and personally own land, just as it would
be crazy and impious to buy and sell pieces of one’s mother.”64
The land is sacred because of its ability to nurture, and all the persons of nature are
related because land is the possibility for their existence: it is what they have in common.
The land is, as such, understood as an integral part of Native American religion because it
is the tie that binds. The religious life of Native Americans is also permeated with
reverence for land, for not only does it speak on behalf of all inhabitants, but it also
affords a sense of purpose in the greater scheme of things. Religious experiences and
visions are provided by nature, and the locations where they occur are considered sacred
as points of communication with nature and the High Spirits. Deloria says, “Sacred
places are the foundation of all other beliefs and practices because they represent the
presence of the sacred in our lives. They properly inform us that we are not larger than
nature and that we have responsibilities to the rest of the natural world that transcend our
own personal desires and wishes.”65 Deloria seems to be saying that these places
reinforce one’s understanding of his human role in nature.
In addition, the indigenous natural surroundings of an individual, especially those
proximal lands that support the lives of communities, tribes, and families for generations,
are seen as places of restoration because of familial ties with the land. Crow Indian chief
“Curley” speaks of his homeland in the following way, “The soil you see is not ordinary
63
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soil – it is the dust of the blood, the flesh, and the bones of our ancestors…You will have
to dig down through the surface before you can find nature’s earth, as the upper portion is
Crow. The land as it is, is my blood and my dead; it is consecrated; and I do not want to
give up any portion of it.”66 The land is infused with the orenda of its inhabitants and the
spirits of his ancestors, and as such he is unwilling to part with it. As “consecrated,” land,
it is sacred to him and all of his people. The Native American does not view the dead as
“away” up in heaven. They are still close by and much loved. The earth is home, and the
earth is also loved. As such, a spiritual family member could not find happiness in some
other place – to dwell somewhere away from home would not be considered a positive
way to spend one’s spiritual life, by any means.
Deloria relates with the depth of attachment that is felt by those who have such an
intimate relationship with their lands, explaining that, “[This sentiment] speaks of an
identity so strong as to be virtually indistinguishable from the earth itself, the human
being as it were, completely in harmony with the Mother Earth and inseparable in every
way.”67 Hence, if unity with the rest of one’s environment (and thus “others”) is a
foundational aspect of the Native American self, it follows that separation from
indigenous lands, and as such the orendas that exist on that land, will cause to potential
imbalance of the self.
This view of the self as closely related to indigenous land is fundamental in many
tribal religions. Deloria indicates that, “The vast majority of Indian tribal religions…This
center enables the people to look out along the four dimensions and locate their lands, to
relate all historical events within the confines of this particular land, and to accept
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responsibility for it…The nature of revelation at sacred places is often of such a personal
nature as to preclude turning it into a subject of missionary activities.”68 Furthermore, the
religious ceremonies of the tribes are “fine-tuned” in accordance with the land in order to
harmonize activity with nature.69 For example if the tribe lives on land that is dry and in
need of rain for farming, the rain dance will be at the forefront of religious importance.
This example illustrates the need for keeping the human spirit, as part of nature, in
balance with the whole of nature and the reciprocal relationship between human action
and nature: the unity of the human spirit with the land yields fruitful results and benefits
all “energies” involved – the people are sustained and the land continues to be respected
and cared for by the people. The land is treated as a “Thou.”
Their approach to the land is not one that can easily be linked to terms like, “usage”
and “waste,” for their ways are conservationist, and balance in nature is maintained by
not just taking but giving back; reciprocity is certainly fundamental for maintaining
balance. Replenishment is at the forefront of thought rather than “improvement.” Native
Americans would probably argue that tilling and cultivating the soil, which are activities
that can seriously exhaust soil and resources, especially if done until it is rendered
infertile, is equivalent to inflicting harm on Mother Earth. It is an infringement against
another “Thou” that can only lead to disastrous consequences. In fact it is disrespectful to
all persons related to that land, for they too will experience the consequences of
inappropriate actions toward nature on the part of another; cooperation and respect for
community are necessary to maintain harmony, and ensure the survival and happiness of
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all members. So, relationships are always at the crux of decision-making. Rather than
nature belonging to the American Indian, he belongs to nature.

Part 4: Native American Self
The Native American self is clearly anchored in relationships with others. It is the
definition of others that makes theirs a unique concept. Reverence for not only people,
but also animals, locations and “non-living” entities, as well as metaphysical beings,
creates a diverse and all-inclusive fundamental system of relationships, and situates the
self in constant external rather than internal dialogue. This unity of self with
environment is reflective of a circular and essentially spatial way of organizing the world,
placing tribal history in the context of locations and connections with others based upon
respect and continual awareness of the affects on others of actions taken by the self, and
the need for maintaining balance with nature in order to ensure preservation of all rather
than just some independent or individual ego.
This holistic approach to the world is founded on a perception of reality through
experiencing the self as interconnected with the world through relationships; thus,
approaching it with an attitude of “Thouness” is appropriate. The possibility for orenda to
exist in any animate or inanimate object of either nature, or that is a product of man’s
creation is not overlooked, and so everything is approached with respect and caution.
Fixico explains, “In circular philosophy, all things are related and involved in the broad
scope of Indian life…A circular approach toward life is inherent in Indian cultures since
time immemorial.”70 And in light of this, Deloria insists that for the Native American,
“There is not, therefore, that determined cause…to subdue the Earth and its living things.
70
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Instead the awareness of the meaning of life comes from observing how the various
living things appear to mesh to provide a whole tapestry.”71 There is no bright line of
separation between land and “persons,” because of the underlying unity of all things.
Native American self belongs to nature, and since there exists a keen awareness that
balance is required in nature – that harmony is necessary for healthy continuance of all
things - we can appreciate just why having an “I-Thou” attitude toward others is of such
value. Reciprocity, community, equality, and cooperation are all terms that reflect this
attitude and Native American cultural ways of life. The circular nature of each term
cannot be denied – they all inherently suggest shared contact with and for the benefit of
all involved, rather than imply any sort of unilateral relationship. This type of relationship
with the world is certainly reflective of balanced existence. It is evident, as such, that the
Sacred Hoop is unqualified as the symbolic representation of Native American cultural
beliefs.
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CHAPTER 3
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR RADICALLY
DIFFERENT WORLD VIEWS
“We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land
as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect.”
--Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac

Certainly, as human beings, members of both Colonial American and Native
American cultures had definite needs and wants; for instance, the need for survival in the
forms of food, water, and shelter is mutual. Both cultures, like any, flourished in
community with others in order to make life easier and happier. Both cultures had
traditions, rituals, and religious beliefs that drive their understandings of what types of
activities were required of them, or were desirable in which to engage, in order to live
right. How, then, did it come to pass that the Colonial American culture exercised
dominion over Native American cultures, especially in light of the Christian heritage that
Colonials brought with them to the new land? With known sacred ties to their lands, why
were Native Americans forced from their indigenous areas, in many cases, and sent to
live on reservations? Why are many Americans - whether scientists, housewives,
academics, or blue-collar workers - engaged in discussion of the state of the environment
and sustainability? Cogent answers to all of these questions, and probably many more,
can be found quite easily by tracing how the self-concepts of these two cultures’
members, upon meeting and interacting, eventually generated the state of affairs in which
America finds itself today.
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In my first two chapters I laid out the fundamentals of both Colonial American and
Native American self-concepts as the groundwork for the third. It was shown that the
Colonial American self is inwardly oriented, and is fundamentally founded upon the basis
of ownership; whereas, the Native American self is relational – it is rooted in nature, and
set on operating in its role as part of a unified, balanced web of others that is not limited
in scope to just human beings and human activities. In this chapter, I intend to compare
and contrast these two views, shedding light on their differences and parallels. In doing
so, I hope to show that the concept of Native American self is illuminating, and can serve
as a resource for learning how to adjust the role of traditional American self in relation to
others and nature. I will spell out some of the implications that these differing selfconcepts have had for both groups of people and their shared environment. In doing so, I
hope my reader will formulate their own answers to the questions posed above.

Part 1: The Problem with Conflicting Definitions of Person
Locke’s position (and the position that most traditional Western views hold, based on
Cartesian philosophy) on that which constitutes personhood comes down to whether or
not the entity in question is both conscious and thinking. The ability to reason and reflect
sets man apart from beast, but according to Locke, technically need not. This is based
upon his somewhat indiscriminate view of substance’s role, if any beast or object in the
world with this ability aside from man should be made known. Now, given that man is
equipped with the ability to voice, or at least show in some sense, that he is truly
conscious and reasonable, while other entities cannot do so in the same capacity that
humans can, he has put the possibility of personhood beyond the reach of any non-
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humans altogether (and perhaps some humans, too). The definition of person, as such,
has formal boundaries for the Colonial American: if you are a human, then you are a
person; if you are not human, then you cannot be a person.
Native American views of personhood are much more tolerant, or willing to give the
benefit of the doubt to the possibility that anything can be a person. This is especially true
based upon the belief that sacred energy or spirits do, and/or potentially can, pervade any
given object in nature whether human, animal, or even inanimate. This premise extends
the definition of person well beyond the Colonial American scope As Locke has
indicated, he does not deny the possibility that “soul” can take up residence in any other
type of entity, but as far as his human intellect and sensory experiences can gather, he
thinks that it would be absurd for this to occur. After all, inanimate objects show no
telltale signs of even consciousness, much less reasoning skills.
The Colonial American could really only experience nature as it is presented to him
through his senses, leaving it open to his personal interpretation, and however far his own
reasoning may take him. Native Americans are oriented toward reciprocity – of being
open to the possible experience of otherness. Their extension of personhood is accepted,
although not necessarily unquestioned. Alexander notes a specific sweatbath chant of the
Omaha, which are spoken by a priest after addressing the “seven places”:1
Where is his mouth, by which there may be utterance of speech?
Where is his heart, to which there may come knowledge and understanding?
Where are his feet, whereby he may move from place to place?
We question in wonder,
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Yet verily it is said you alone have power to receive supplications,
Aged One, eçka.2
In this chant, the priest is addressing “the rock,” which is also known as “Grandsire” or
“The Aged One.” The rock represents steadfastness, or strength, and is considered the
shared and immovable “dwelling-place” of all.3 The chanter adds that the questions are
asked in “wonder,” meaning that he is awe-stricken by the powers of the rock that bears
virtually no physical resemblance to human beings.
Alexander discusses the reasons behind this acceptance that is born by Native
American self. He explains in the following segment:
[But] the seven places are not merely places, they are also powers or persons, imbued
with that life and meaning which is the cement and bond of creation, giving it sense
and bearing…The physical world, in brief, is only a body, it is a thought-structure,
and a living being somehow in the end curative of man’s ills and a solace to his soul –
as we poetically conceive nature today…The wonder is certainly aroused by a
conviction of an animism, an inner life in all things for which there is no outward and
responsive sign in the dumb object. It is a conviction that reaches very deep into the
heart of a human instinct which natively compels mankind to ascribe spirit to nature.
Socially we attribute life-impulses to bodies analogous to our own and to conduct
which may be interpreted in the language of our own needs and appetites; but
metaphysically we are not content with such a limitation of life, but expand its realm
out and beyond the range of forms such as animate bodies show. This is that animism,
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apart from which little in human lore can be understood, yet which of itself is one of
the least obvious modes of understanding.4
Thus the animism that is ascribed to non-human entities is instinctual, according to
Alexander. Native Americans are “compelled” to attribute objects of nature with having
souls, or spiritual energy, in order to find comfort and solace as people as part of (rather
than separate from) nature.
This animism serves as the condition for the possibility of communicating with the
rest of nature. It allows birds, trees, land, and spirits to speak - and be heard by those
open and willing enough to listen. It funds stories that are passed down by Native
Americans to their young with the possibility of having a meaningful discussion, for
example, of a pipe or calumet entering the lodge of an animal as a request to it allow
itself to be taken for human use. It also allows the animal to understand and respond with
its own decision, which the Native American will actively listen for – his skill of having a
receptive attitude toward all of nature having been honed from early on in life. Here we
see the taking of an “I-Thou” attitude; a Native American approach to the grand scale of
“others.” Accordingly, the dialogical self is engaged in inner and outer communication
that is founded on the vast array of relationships that one necessarily finds one’s self in.
But it was much different indeed for the Colonial American self. Communication
with “other-than-persons” was largely illogical and certainly impossible; there was no
need for it in any case because it would have been (especially in the case of inanimates)
completely one-sided. The ascendancy of human over the other developed neither the
need nor the desire within the individual Colonial self to attempt any type of
communication in the first place, and thus the role of internal dialogue took center stage
4
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as a result. It is really best described as a closed circuit – the self-concept develops
through internal dialogue, playing a powerful role in shaping self as one constantly
assesses and reassesses what it means to be a self according to the standards of the culture
that one is part of. One is situated within roles, for sure, according to relationships such
as, “son of, mother of, brother of, sister of, and so forth, but this is the fundamental
difference in comparison with Native Americans - extension of the dialogical self is
limited in possibility, reaching only as far as relationships with “others” that is consistent
with the limited definition of “persons” within the Colonial American culture.

Part 2: Ownership v. Relationship
Because of their differing opinions of what persons are, the Colonial American
approaches nature quite differently than the Native American. The Colonial is interested
in nature only insofar as it is useful to him. The “I-It” connection does not entail
reciprocity, cooperation, or any of the qualities that are requisite of an “I-Thou”
relationship; rather, ownership is the basis. Ownership of one’s self is at the core of the
“I” term of the former type. Support for this claim is found in the work of Buber, who
indicates that the “I” in the “I-It” scenario is subjective, and focuses on using and
experiencing; subjectivity is primary.5
In owning one’s self, it follows that any labor and fruits that are the product thereof
belong to that self as well. It is easily justifiable for the Colonial American to enclose and
use land in any way deemed desirable, for we learned that the mingling of labor with
nature endows that self with the nature that the self has turned its attention to. Hunting,
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trapping, and the like are also means for survival, and as long as no waste is produced,
there is no harm in owning whatever is necessary for life. The introduction of money, of
course, opens doors even wider, because possibilities are endless when goods that might
spoil can be exchanged for nonperishable goods and currency. Money is the means by
which he can justify ownership of far more land than is needed for personal cultivation,
and gathering and hunting are completely acceptable at any level insofar as spoilage is
prevented through sales of goods.
This means of justification for unrestrained usage of natural resources cannot be seen
within the Native American self-concept. Full awareness of the intricate balance of nature
through understanding of relational ties with all creatures, plants, and even objects does
not permit the “I” of the “I-Thou” affiliation to underestimate the importance of
conservation and replenishment. Permission must be part of the bargain, and there must
be proper compensation for all parties involved in any exchange. This attitude is certainly
more beneficial for all persons in the long run, in that it ensures the balance and health of
nature as a whole, rather than just the well being of one side. The Native American is in,
not simply of nature. The state of equality is uncompromised.
But, was there not similarity between the Colonial American and the Native
American? Were members of both cultures not persons? It is certainly the case that both
parties were persons in a biological sense, and the same means for survival are required
in order to sustain either. Why is it, then, that the Colonial American could take land and
resources from the indigenous people of the new land? This dilemma, in part, also rests
upon the definition of person as legitimated by Descartes and endorsed by Locke. First,
because the Colonial American did not see the land as being used industriously; where no
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labor is mingled with the land, it is being wasted, and as such it is considered fair game
for interested parties willing to “improve” it. The Native American did not see the land as
lying in waste, but as imbued with a personhood unto itself, and home to other orenda at
the same time.
Second, although the Colonial American was compelled to respect the inalienable
rights of other selves, it seemed that Native Americans were not necessarily given the
benefit of the doubt regarding the authenticity of their personhood. Although Locke’s
discussion of the “permission of the Law of Nature” articulates that, “he and all the rest
of Mankind are one Community, make up one Society distinct from all other Creatures,”6
Native Americans were considered savages, without laws and true religion. Calloway
notes that despite the major upheaval to their way of living, Native Americans dealt with
the newcomers peacefully when possible,7 trading with them and listening to them, as
well as trying to communicate their own ways of life. He writes,
However, as Americans in the new nation looked back across the long span of
colonial history, they rarely saw anything but instances of Indian hostility. All Indians
came to be regarded as warlike “savages” who had fought against the pioneers and
had resisted “civilization” every step of the way. The struggles of Indian peoples to
defend their lands and cultures provided their conquerors with further justification to
take what was left of their land and destroy what remained of their traditional ways of
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life. Indian people had been virtually everywhere in colonial America, but there could
be no place for “savages” in the new society Americans hoped to create.8
The way that Native Americans reasoned and saw their world was disparate with the
European way of thinking, and so it was easy for them to label Native Americans as
“savages.” Holly writes, “Given the Anglo-European tendency in Locke’s time and for
some time thereafter to think of Indians as brutish and unreasoning, we can see Locke’s
argument as opening the door to Anglo Europeans to hunt down and punish indigenous
peoples such as American Indians when such peoples’ reasoning did not come to
conclusions similar to that of educated Englishmen.”9 Furthermore, because of Native
American resistance to Colonial Americans, indigenous peoples were looked down upon
as a nuisance. Eventually Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830, which served
to corral Native American peoples perhaps, but thankfully not crush them from existence.
Hence, it can be ascertained that the traditional Western definition of “person” did not
extend to all humans; rather, it extended only to those to whom it was convenient to
afford the status.
Thus, in this discussion of personhood, it becomes clear that the implications for each
view are quite different. Because Native American self extended the definition to include
all entities in nature, he had a fundamentally different approach to others as “Thou(s).”
Certainly newcomers were approached with caution, but there was very often a
willingness to trade and negotiate peaceably despite the intrusion and upheaval of life, as
one knew it. On the other hand, the Colonial American’s approach to others in terms of
authenticity of personhood led to the consequences we see today, with Native Americans
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driven from their lands and sent to reservations. The forced Trail of Tears journey, for
example, speaks to the horrors that so very many endured along the way. Native
Americans were compartmentalized into the “It” term of the “I-It” attitude espoused by
Colonial Americans. An “It” can be manipulated and used, and whether the object of the
term is land, some particular natural resource, or a “savage,” is of no consequence. In
fact, it may have even been considered one’s duty as a Colonial American.

Part 3: Religion and Accountability: Implications for Our Shared Environment
The Colonial American self was accountable – it is contained within the very
meaning of being a self, and is a precept of personal moral activity. Having graduated
from the State of
Nature at some point, men are accountable to each other in accordance with written (and
even unwritten) laws of their land. Bearing in mind that the Colonials were highly
influenced by Christianity, especially in the form of Puritanism, personal accountability
in the new land takes on particular meanings and duties according to the Scriptures. It is
in fact the duty of the Christian to use the land as it was intended. God gave it to men, and
through industriousness they are expected to improve and cultivate in order to survive
and reproduce – for populating the earth is also required by God according to the
Scriptures. The Puritan way of life is well known for promoting labor, as a means to
happiness and fulfilling one’s duty on earth – and laziness, as a sin, is completely
unacceptable.
Accordingly, it was both a moral duty and right to take “unused” land from Native
Americans and improve upon it. Miller notes that Clergyman John Bulkley, whom he
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describes as an ominous and neglected “prophet of rationalism” that served in a frontier
town called Colchester, Connecticut, wrote on the instruction of the use of reason. He
was interested in defending the appropriation of land by New Englanders. Bulkley used
Locke as his authority when he wrote that the title to property is rightfully the New
Englander’s who works the land, and the “lazy Indian” never had any right to it in the
first place.10 As such, compensation for the land was unnecessary – and it was sinful to
let it lie in waste, after all. Since Native Americans never removed land from the
“common,” it was open to the new settler to use and enclose however he saw fit such that
he could benefit from it. Thus, ownership meant that one is fulfilling one’s moral duty in
accordance with Divine command, and it was his right to keep whatsoever he mingled his
labor with. Accountability for the actions of Colonials, in their taking of land and
resources from Native Americans, was essentially a non-issue when put in the terms laid
forth by their religious beliefs.
But Native American religion sought to maintain balance, which means that
intrinsically it did not support ownership as a means to living properly.11 Even the pipe
ceremony symbolizes the equality that existed within Native American metaphysical
beliefs. Holly explains, “Each smoker of the sacred pipe symbolically inhales the orendas
(the wakan powers) of all the creatures and entities of nature and mingles his or her own
orenda with these in exhaling. In so doing, the participant organismically experiences the
whole of the ecosystem inwardly and externally…the sacred pipe ceremony is felt as an
actual uniting of self with the whole ecosystem or great energy network.”12 Unity in no
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way implies ownership, or vice versa for that matter. Wherever ownership is present,
there is an assumed hierarchy: a power pyramid.
Accountability is not equivalent for both strains of self. In Native American
philosophy every action is understood in terms of possible consequences that can occur
for rest of nature - as inseparable from nature, one’s self is affected in the same instant.
Therefore, real consequences for the Native American self are automatically built into all
actions. The Colonial American self could take actions that resulted in consequences that
may not directly, or even indirectly, affect him. The Native American self was involved
with respecting nature, in his unified role as part of nature and equal to all others. The
Colonial American self was involved in maintaining his proper role in the hierarchical
system wherein he was a servant of God - and blessed with reason, he was also charged
with power over the lesser creatures of nature, with nature as a mere platform, created as
a gift from God and placed there for his fulfillment of life’s duties in accordance with the
Scriptures. He was first and foremost accountable to God, and accountable to other
reasonable men as far as they see fit to hold him so. The Native American was
accountable to all of nature.
The Native American self-concept is, in fact, consistent with the type of attitude that
advocates of ecocentrism hold toward the environment. This view, says Holly, “holds
that priority should be given legally and ethically to the protection of the well being and
balance of the whole ecosystem, of which plants, animals, soil, air, waterways, etc. are all
seen as fellow citizens alongside humans.”13 The Native American self is the original
advocate of ecocentrism, having understood and practiced this attitude for many, many
years – long before Aldo Leopold coined the term and many of today’s Americans
13

PON, 13-14.
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became concerned about the health of the environment. The developmental process of the
self within Native American Cultures deserves credit for responsibly nurturing a holistic
view of nature within young members of tribes, and instilling within them the proper
skills and values necessary to truly live and conduct actions as people who deeply
understand the importance of balance in nature.
The concept of self, situated in a world full of sacred energy, or orendas, has import
for modern environmentalism in two ways. First, it encompasses conservation. The
utilitarian approach to nature and her resources has proven to be damaging for our
environment, but approaching nature with an attitude of reciprocity and courtesy –
allowing species and resources to replenish before overusing – is unquestionably a more
sustainable practice than not. If this idea had been adopted before modern man engaged
in so many destructive activities in the name of progress and industry, perhaps there
would be less reason for many of our environmental concerns today.
Second, the idea that orenda may be present in any object or place in nature, and as
such one should approach all of nature with respect and caution, strikingly evokes
thoughts of what is referred to today as The Precautionary Principle.” This principle,
developed in 1982 and expanded in 1998, is of great significance in studies of
environmental ethics and law, has been adopted or referred to by many countries,14 and
was made law by the European Union. It is a basic statement of precaution against
engaging in any activity that poses a potential threat to the environment or its inhabitants
should not be undertaken (even if not scientifically verifiable), and that the burden of
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proof falls on the action taker as opposed to those who would potentially be affected by
the action.
Whereas, the Native American self was thought to be savage and unreasonable, it is
difficult to find qualities in the Colonial American concept of self that come close to
typifying the sort of attitude that is as accepting and open – or conducive to a healthy
environment. Now that property owners have established themselves throughout the
entire country, we have seen them become increasingly worried about the health of their
property, and very often their families also, with stories of contamination leeching into
drinking water and food sources increasing steadily in the news. In a country that has
become modernized and developed, built principally by founders with a concept of self as
“owner,” it is ironically apparent that accountability is difficult to own -and it is rarely
embraced wholeheartedly.

Concluding Remarks
Jane Goodall writes that, “Among humans, members of one group may see
themselves as quite distinct from members of another, and may then treat group and nongroup individuals differently. Indeed, non-group members may even be ‘dehumanized’
and regarded almost as creatures of a different species. Once this happens people are
freed from the inhibitions and social sanctions that operate within their own group, and
can behave to non-group members in ways that would not be tolerated amongst their
own.”15 Groups are made of “selves,” and one’s self-concept, while shaped by culture,
can only be reflected upon individually and privately. Indeed, when Jane Goodall speaks
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of freedom from sanctions and treating non-group members in ways that are intolerable
within native groups, one should keep in mind that the treatment she refers to can just as
easily be thought to move in a positive direction – with attitudinal changes, we can
“humanize” rather than reduce the rest of nature to something to be owned and
manipulated, and find out if it is possible to lose the inhibitions that reinforce beliefs and
actions that have not necessarily contributed to the health of our world. Had the Colonial
American embraced the teachings of Native Americans, what might this corner of the
world be like today?
The concepts of Native American and Colonial American self are not only valuable in
a historical sense, but offer all thinkers who are well versed in Western tradition the
opportunity to compare these competing self-concepts that essentially clashed and
eventually emerged to constitute the culture of America today. I think there is a lesson to
be learned in how expanding traditional boundaries of knowledge and personhood can be
beneficial for modern humanity - and perhaps all of nature. It is also quite interesting to
imagine an environment where the more efficient practice of conservation has eliminated
the need for mitigation of damages, or fumbling around with the reliability of calculating
the carrying capacity of Earth. The concept of Native American “self,” in this sense, I
have found especially illuminating. I sincerely hope that my reader is also intrigued, and
is inspired to find additional ways to observe the world through Native American eyes.
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